

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02268 301346Z

44

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

----- 089730

O R 301250Z JUL 73

FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3497

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO CAIRO 2268

EXDIS

5. IF WE FEEL THAT IT IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK (AND I FEEL STRONGLY THAT IT IS), THEN WE SHOULD CONSIDER HOW WE CAN ADDRESS THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE THAT IS NOW HOLDING UP PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. WE OR SOME OTHER PARTY COULD BEGIN BY DISCUSSING THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WITH BOTH SIDES, PROBING FOR ANY POSSIBLE GIVE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNBRIDGEABLE, WE AND OTHER CONCERNED ONLOOKERS SHOULD THEN CONSIDER WHAT WE CAN DO TO ALTER THE INCENTIVES OR SANCTIONS OPERATING ON BOTH PARTIES IN SUCH A WAY THAT A COMPROMISE ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE BY ONE OR THE OTHER OF THEM WOULD SEEM TO THEM TO BE TO THEIR OWN NET ADVANTAGE.

6. THE EGYPTIAN REGIME HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE BY THE ISRAELIS AND OTHERS SINCE 1967 TO SETTLE ON ISRAEL'S TERMS, IE., FORMALLY CEDE LAND TO ISRAEL.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 02268 301346Z

FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT DONE SO DEMONSTRATES THAT

EGYPTIAN LEADERS WOULD RATHER RESIST THESE PRESSURES THAN RISK POSSIBILITIES OF OVERTHROW AND ASSASSINATION. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE ARE IN A POSITION TO BRING ANY ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON SADAT OF THE KIND THAT COULD CAUSE SADAT AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO CHANGE THEIR JUDGMENT OF EGYPTIAN POLITICAL REALITIES.

7. IN FACT, SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES DIVIDING TWO SIDES MAY NOT BE AS SERIOUS AS THE TWO PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE HAVE INDICATED. BY UTILIZING SUCH DEVICES AS DEMILITARIZED ZONES, INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCES AND PERHAPS LONG-TERM LEASES, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE FACE-SAVING ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD ENABLE SADAT TO CLAIM "SOVEREIGNTY" OVER ALL EGYPTIAN LAND AND AT SAME TIME PROVIDE FOR ALL REASONABLE (AND PERCEIVED) ISRAELI SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER PARTS OF SINAI.

8. MAIN PROBLEM HAS BEEN THAT ISRAELIS HAVE NOT BEEN INTERESTED IN PROVIDING FACE-SAVING DEVICES FOR SADAT. FROM CAIRO, IT SEEMS THAT THEY ARE MORE INTERESTED IN PUNISHING HIM FOR WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE EGYPTIAN SINS IN THE PAST. NOW THAT WE HAVE AGAIN DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED OUR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL BY CASTING SC VETO, I BELIEVE TIME IS APPROPRIATE TO CONVEY FORCEFULLY TO ISRAELIS OUR BELIEF THAT THEY SHOULD RESPOND TO OUR SUPPORT BY OFFERING SADAT SOME SUCH FACE-SAVING DEVICES IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT.

9. WALDHEIM'S VISIT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN THIS PROCESS. EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO CONDUCT INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL THROUGH WALDHEIM OR ANYONE ELSE WILL BE IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO THEIR PERCEPTION OF EXTENT TO WHICH ISRAELIS WILLING TO GO TO GIVE THEM THE NEEDED FACE-SAVING DEVICES. BY NOW, I BELIEVE, SADAT IS A REALIST ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, BUT HE IS ALSO A REALIST ON THE QUESTION OF HOW FAR HE CAN GO WITHOUT BEING OVERTHROWN. THE KEY TO THE PROBLEM IS A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS TO HELP SADAT WORK OUT THE NEEDED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 02268 301346Z

FACADE. IF WALDHEIM, WHEN HE VISITS EGYPT, CAN BRING WITH HIM ANY INDICATION OF ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO HELP SADAT ERECT THIS FACADE, I BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES WOULD BE SECONDARY AND COULD BE QUICKLY WORKED OUT.
WILEY

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: VISITS, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 30 JUL 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: morefirh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973CAIRO02268
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P750007-1665
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t1973074/aaaaacnz.tel
Line Count: 113
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: morefirh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 SEP 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27-Sep-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <04-Jan-2002 by morefirh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO WALDHEIM VISIT TO ME
TAGS: PFOR, EG, UN, (WALDHEIM, KURT)
To: n/a
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005